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Abstract
Previous studies suggest that punishment is a useful way to promote co-
operation in the well-mixed public goods game, whereas it still lacks spe-
cific evidence that punishment maintains cooperation in spatial prisoner’s
dilemma game as well. To address this issue, we introduce a mechanism of
recorded punishment, involved with memory and punishment, into spatial
prisoner’s dilemma game. We find that increasing punishment rate or mem-
ory length promotes the evolution of cooperation monotonously. Interest-
ingly, compared with traditional version, recorded punishment will facilitate
cooperation better through a recovery effect. Moreover, through examin-
ing the process of evolution, we provide an interpretation to this promotion
phenomenon, namely, the recovery effect can be warranted by an evolution
resonance of standard deviation of fitness coefficient. Finally, we confirm
our results by studying the impact of uncertainty within strategy adoptions.
We hope that our work may sharpen the understanding of the cooperative
behavior in the society.
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1. Introduction
Cooperative behavior is abundant in the real world, ranging from mi-
croorganism groups to complex human societies [1, 2]. To understand the
emergence and persistence of cooperation, it has attracted great interest in
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biology, physics, economics, as well as sociology [3, 4]. Evolutionary game
theory has proved to be one of the most fruitful approaches to investigate
this problem by studying evolutionary models based on the so-called social
dilemmas [5, 6]. Well-known examples of these dilemmas include public goods
game for group of interaction individuals [7, 8, 9, 10], snowdrift game [11, 12]
and prisoner’s dilemma game [13, 14, 15, 16, 17] as paradigms for pairwise in-
teractions. Among these evolutionary games, the prisoner’s dilemma game,
in particular, has acquired prominent achievements in theoretical and ex-
perimental studies [18, 19, 20]. In a typical prisoner’s dilemma game, two
players have a choice between cooperation and defection. They will receive
the reward R if both players cooperate, and the punishment P if both choose
defection. However, if one chooses defection against a cooperator, it will at-
tain the temptation T while the co-player obtain the sucker’s payoff S. The
ranking of four payoffs satisfies T > R > P > S, from which it is clear that
selfish players are forced to choose defection which is best for individual,
irrespective of the co-player’s option, hence the dilemma occurs. In order
to overcome this dilemma, specific mechanisms supporting cooperation are
needed (see Ref. [21] for a recent review).
Over the past decades, a number of mechanisms have been proposed
which are able to support the emergence of cooperation [22, 23, 24], while
the introduction of spatial structure is one of them, which is also refereed as
network reciprocity [25, 26]. This successful research was firstly suggested
by Nowak and May in their seminal paper [20]. In the spatial game, players
were situated on the vertices of a graph. Each player did not interact with
every other, but with its neighbors that were marked by the direct edges.
The payoff of each player was acquired by playing the game with its neigh-
bors. Then the evolution of individual was determined through adopting
the strategy of its neighbor, provided its fitness was higher. Interestingly,
it proved that network reciprocity played a significant role in sustaining co-
operation, and cooperators could survive through forming compact clusters.
Stimulated by this pioneering work, a great many investigations based on
spatial structure have been extended to date [27, 28, 29, 30] (for a survey see
[31]). Most notably, paradigmatic examples include heterogeneous activity
of players [32, 33], reward mechanism [34], influence of noise level [27, 35],
preferential selection of neighbors [36], effect of expected payoffs [37], mobil-
ity of players [38, 39, 40], differences in time scales [41], to name but a few.
While among these mechanisms, what triggers our research interest most is
the reward mechanism. In a recent work of Szolnoki and Perc [42], it shows
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that moderate rewards may promote cooperation better than high rewards.
Meanwhile, we note that the promise of punishment and reward in promoting
the evolution of cooperation is debatable, and the effect of punishment was
mainly investigated in public goods game [43, 44, 45], but seldom studied in
prisoner’s dilemma game. Motivated by these facts, it is meaningful to con-
sider a simple punishment mechanism in the prisoner’s dilemma game, where
players will be appropriately punished if they fail to pass their strategies to
their offspring, since similar phenomena about punishment are ubiquitous in
modern human and economy societies.
Furthermore, it is found that the coevolution of game theory is becoming
a mushrooming avenue to explore the evolution of cooperation [46, 47, 48,
49]. Via coevolution, not only the evolution of strategies over time could
be reflected, but also the adaptive development of network topologies or
evolution rule (for a further view see Refs. [50, 51]). In recent investigations
[49], they showed that cooperation could be promoted within a large scale
when the coevolution of strategy updating and network topology was taken
into account. In addition, we also note that when the teaching activity of
players evolved with time, the maintenance of cooperation could be greatly
promoted as well [52]. Inspired by these innovations and the above idea
of punishment, it is instructive to ask if we introduce memory length into
punishment mechanism, namely, the punishment of each player changes over
time, is it beneficial for the evolution of cooperation or not?
In this work, we study the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game with the in-
troduction of recorded punishment which is involved with memory and pun-
ishment. Before the game, each player was uniformly distributed the same
fitness coefficient, which makes the game return to the traditional version.
However, with the evolvement of the game, individual fitness coefficient will
also change according to its current state and memory. Our main purpose
is to study how this mechanism affects the evolution of cooperation, and if
it really facilitates cooperation, what supports the promotion phenomenon.
By means of systematic Monte Carlo simulations, we show that, actually as
what we expect, this mechanism can promote the evolution of cooperation.
Interestingly, we find that this promotion phenomenon will be supported by
a recovery effect, which can be well interpreted by an evolution resonance of
standard deviation of fitness coefficient. Moreover, we examine the impact
of different levels of uncertainty by strategy adoptions. In the remainder
of this paper we will first describe the considered evolutionary game, subse-
quently we will present the main results, and finally we will summarize our
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conclusions.
2. The Model
We consider an evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game with players lo-
cated on the sites (x) of a regular L×L square lattice with periodic boundary
conditions. Initially, the player on the site x is designated as a cooperator
(sx = C) or defector (sx = D) with equal probability, and is distributed
a fitness coefficient φx(t) as well. As characterized by previous literatures
[33, 35], we use the rescaled payoff matrix: the temptation to defect T = b
(the highest payoff received by a defector if playing against a cooperator),
reward for mutual cooperation R = 1, and both punishment for mutual defec-
tion P and the sucker’s payoff S (the lowest payoff received by a cooperator if
playing against a defector) equaling to 0, whereby 1 ≤ b ≤ 2 ensures a proper
payoff ranking. The game is iterated in accordance with the Monte Carlo
(MC) simulation procedure comprising the following elementary steps. First,
a randomly selected player x acquires its payoff Px by playing the game with
its four nearest neighbors, and evaluates its fitness Πx by following expression
Πx = φx(t)× Px. (1)
Next, one randomly chosen neighbor y also obtains its fitness Πy by the same
way as player x. Lastly, player x adopts the strategy from the randomly
selected player y in accordance with the probability,
W (sy → sx) =
1
1 + exp[(Πx −Πy)/K]
, (2)
where K denotes the amplitude of noise or its inverse (1/K), the so-called
intensity of selection [19]. In one full Monte Carlo step (MCS), each player
x has a chance once on average to adopt a strategy from the randomly se-
lected neighbor as described above. Interestingly, the fitness coefficient φx(t)
is also updating according to the following protocol. Initially, each player
x possesses the same fitness coefficient φx(t) = 1.0 to avoid preferential in-
fluence before the game. Then, if player x adopts the strategy of neighbor
y, which is similar to a failure among the competitions or battles, its fitness
coefficient will decrease according to φx(t + 1) = (1 − α) ∗ φx(t), where α
(α≪ 1.0) is the punishment rate. Otherwise, the fitness coefficient will keep
constant. Importantly, we assume that the step when player x is punished
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is regarded as the first step. If player x keeps its strategy changeless in the
subsequent M steps (called memory length), which is like remaining inde-
fectible in the succedent competitions or battles, its fitness coefficient will
recover 1.0. However, once player x still adopts strategy from others during
one of the subsequent M steps, that step will spontaneously be regarded as
the first step over again. The above process will be iterated till its fitness
coefficient gets back to 1.0. It is notable that these setups can be interpreted
from the social viewpoints, defected individuals among the competitions or
battles lose part of their own properties or territories, but importantly they
try to redeem their loss through a certain period of struggle.
Results of Monte Carlo simulations presented below were obtained on
populations comprising 100×100 to 400×400 individuals, whereby the frac-
tion of cooperators ρC was determined within last 10
4 full steps of overall
2 × 105 MCS. In order to overcome the influence of large M value, longer
transient time was discarded. Moreover, since the recorded punishment may
introduce heterogeneous influence of fitness coefficient, final results were av-
eraged over 20 to 40 independent runs for each set of parameter values in
order to assure suitable accuracy.
3. Simulation Results and Discussion
We start by examining the effect of the above introduced punishment rate
α on the evolution of cooperation while keeping a certain memory length M
constant. Figure 1 shows how ρC varies in dependence on the temptation of
defect b for different values of α. Evidently, α = 0 (irrespective of the value
of M) recovers the traditional version of spatial prisoner’s dilemma game,
where cooperators will die out even if the value of b is small. However, as α
increases, the evolution of cooperation will be promoted more effectively. It
can be clearly observed that for α = 0.02 cooperation can be facilitated to
a near-complete dominant strategy when the value of b is small. With the
continuous increment of α, defectors can only exist when the temptation to
defect is sufficient large. These results suggest that when the punishment is
taken into account, the evolution of cooperation will thrive. While an increase
of punishment rate α will directly result in an increase of cooperation, since
the introduction of punishment may generate a heterogeneous state for the
whole population during the process of evolution.
In what follows, we will explore the ability of memory length M to facil-
itate and maintain cooperation. Results presented in figure 2 clearly shows
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ρC in dependence on the whole relevant span of b for different values of M .
For M = 0, it corresponds to the case where only punishment exists but
no memory is contained in the game. Compared with the results of tradi-
tional version in figure 1, it is evident that better facilitation of cooperation
could be warranted, which implies that the performance of merely spatial
reciprocity has been improved [31]. Interestingly, as the value of memory
length M increases, the evolution of cooperation will fare better, namely,
the survivability of cooperators will monotonously enhance with increasing
M . In particular, when the value of M is sufficiently large, the promotion
effect on cooperation will become nearly changeless with the increment of
M , that is, the fraction of cooperators will converge to a deterministic value
for enough large value of M . It is worth emphasizing that in such condition,
the evolution of system will take longer time to arrive at the steady state.
Moreover, it is also notable that compared with the case of merely punish-
ment (M = 0), cooperation could be better promoted within the framework
involved with the joint influence of punishment and memory.
To further certify the above observations regarding the promotion of coop-
eration, we visually inspect the characteristic spatial patterns of cooperators
and defectors for different situations. As illustrated in figure 3, in the origi-
nal patterns (t = 0) cooperators and defectors are evenly distributed on the
lattice. For the traditional version which does not include punishment and
memory (upper panel), cooperators will decrease soon and form sliced coop-
erator clusters. With the evolution of system, the few remaining cooperator
clusters can not resist against the invasion of defectors, and defection will
finally become the dominance strategy, which implies that only the network
reciprocity among cooperators can not sufficiently work if the value of b is
relatively high [31]. In other cases, when the punishment was introduced
into the game, evident change can be observed (middle panel). We can see
that cooperators will first decrease and form small clusters, then these coop-
erator clusters can insure appropriate environment for cooperation thriving
through keeping their dynamic sizes nearly constant. Interestingly, based on
the above achievements of punishment, the joint effect of punishment and
memory on the evolution of cooperation is more distinct as lower panel of
figure 3 illustrates. The few remaining cooperator clusters not only resist
against the fast invasion of defection, but importantly, they start to recover
the lost ground and take up the whole system. Consequently, the recorded
punishment involved with punishment and memory can result in a recovery
effect, which halts and eventually reverts the fast vanishing of cooperators
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toward their undisputed dominance.
It remains of interest to explain why cooperative behavior is promoted
through a recovery effect. In order to provide answers, we investigate in figure
4 time courses for standard deviation of fitness coefficient S(φ) and fraction
of cooperators ρC under different situations that have been discussed above.
As is well known, standard deviation denotes the deviation degree between
individual values and average value of system. The larger the value of stan-
dard deviation, the more remarkable the heterogeneity among players. For
the traditional version, the standard deviation will always equal zero (note
that values of S(φ) were recorded in-between full Monte Carlo steps), which
means that fitness coefficient is the same for each player. In such case, co-
operators will be decimated and defection becomes the complete dominance
strategy (note that values of ρC were also recorded in-between full Monte
Carlo steps). This is actually what we would expect, given that defectors
are, as individuals, more successful than cooperators and will thus be cho-
sen more likely as the potential strategy if b is large. Interestingly, however,
when the punishment was introduced, the above tide will change. As can be
observed from the top panel of figure 4, in the most early stages of evolution
process the standard deviation will first exhibit a weak peak and then keep
a certain value nearly changeless over time. This implies that the hetero-
geneity among players has been formed within the system. Correspondingly,
this weak peak will halt the decimation of cooperators in the early stages
and turn to the fast spreading of cooperation, which also attests to the fact
that heterogeneity plays an important role in the substantial promotion of
cooperation [29, 32]. Quite surprisingly, when recorded punishment involved
with memory and punishment was considered, we can observe that there
exists an evident peak of standard deviation analogously to the so-called
coherence resonance [53]. While such an evolution resonance of standard de-
viation will effectively change the initial downfall of cooperators, and result
in the faster widespread cooperation. The complete dominance of cooper-
ation in turn accelerates the system returning homogeneous state, namely,
the standard deviation will get back to zero again. Hence, we argue that
the evolution resonance of standard deviation stimulates a recovery effect,
which could promote the evolution of cooperation better than the existence
of heterogeneity among players alone.
Finally, it is instructive to examine the evolution of cooperation under
different levels of uncertainty by strategy adoptions. The latter can be tuned
viaK, which acts as a temperature parameter in the employed Fermi strategy
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adoption function [19]. Accordingly, in the limit K → ∞, all information
is lost, switching to neighbor’s strategy is like tossing a coin. While in the
limit K → 0, the strategy of selected neighbor is always adopted provided
that its fitness is higher. Results of phase separation lines on the K − b
parameter plane are presented in figure 5, whereby below the lines mixed
cooperators and defectors coexist, while above, a homogeneous defector state
prevails. Notably, the phase transition of tradition version (black line) exists
an optimal level of uncertainty for the evolution of cooperation, at which
cooperators are able to survive at the highest value of b, as was reported in
previous literatures [27, 53]. While this phenomenon can only be observed
on interaction topologies lacking overlapping triangles [54]. Interestingly,
when the punishment (red line) and recorded punishment (blue line) were
introduced, the qualitatively analogical phase transitions can be acquired.
They exhibit the optimal values of K as well, but obviously, the coexistence
space of cooperators and defectors is substantial extended, which further
support the above result that cooperation could be greatly facilitated under
the joint effect of memory and punishment. Moreover, these qualitatively
similar phase transitions imply that consideration of recorded punishment
does not alter the initial interaction network, which is slightly different from
some previous literatures [28, 54]. Since the square lattice obviously lacks
overlapping triangles and enables the observation of an optimal of K.
4. Conclusion
In sum, we have studied the effect of recorded punishment involved with
memory and punishment on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial pris-
oner’s dilemma game. We show that recorded punishment is an effective
mechanism to promote cooperation. With monotonously increasing punish-
ment rate or memory length, cooperative behavior will be better promoted.
Interestingly, if only punishment was introduced, cooperators could avoid
the destiny of dying out. In the very early stages of evolution process, co-
operators will first be decimated, then the few remaining cooperators would
form small clusters to resist the invasion of defectors. With the evolution
of game these clusters will become large and impervious to defector attacks
even at high temptations to defect. Meanwhile, we show that punishment
could result in the heterogeneous distribution of individual fitness coefficient,
whereby the heterogeneity plays an important role in the promotion of co-
operation [29, 32]. Further interesting is the fact that the consideration of
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recoded punishment could make cooperation thrive better, even to the com-
plete dominance. While this facilitation phenomenon of cooperation has been
attributed to a recovery effect, namely, in the very early stages of the game
defectors are able to plunder very effectively, but the few remaining coop-
erators form clusters and recover the lost ground towards their undisputed
dominance soon. Quite correspondingly, this recovery effect can be explained
by an evolution resonance of standard deviation. When the standard devia-
tion of individual fitness coefficient reaches a peak, which means an evident
heterogeneous state within system, the initial downfall of cooperators will
be effectively halted and turn to the fast spreading. When cooperation be-
comes the dominance strategy, the standard deviation of fitness coefficient
will return zero which makes the system regain the homogeneous state. In
addition, by exploring the phase transition lines, we further support the re-
sult that recorded punishment promotes cooperation better.
Since recorded punishment seems very reasonable and very widely ap-
plicable as well realistically justifiable. We hope that it can inspire further
studies, especially provide the theoretical instruction to some social dilem-
mas.
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Figure 1: (color online) Frequency of cooperator ρC in dependence on the parameter b
for different values of punishment rate α. Note that α = 0 will recover the traditional
version, while the increment of α will introduce punishment into game. Depicted results
were obtained for M = 5 and K = 0.1.
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Figure 2: (color online) Frequency of cooperator ρC in dependence on the parameter b
for different values of memory length M . Note that with increment of memory length M ,
cooperation will be greatly facilitated. However, the enhancement of cooperation will reach
a limit if memory length is sufficient large. Depicted results were obtained for α = 0.1 and
K = 0.1.
Figure 3: (color online) Characteristic spatial patterns of cooperators (blue) and defectors
(yellow) under different situations. Initially cooperators and defectors are distributed
evenly, but they evolve into different patterns. Top panel: it does not include punishment
and memory (α = 0 and M = 0), i.e., traditional version; middle panel: only consider
the influence of punishment (α = 0.1 and M = 0); bottom panel: both punishment and
memory exist (α = 0.1 and M = 5). Snapshots were given after t =0, 10, 100, 200, 10000
steps for all the panels. Depicted results were obtained for b = 1.05 and K = 0.1.
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Figure 4: (color online) Time courses depicting standard deviation of individual fitness
coefficient S(φ) and fraction of cooperator ρC for three different situations. Top panel:
it depicts the evolution of standard deviation, which reflects the distribution of payoff
coefficient φx(t) among players. Note that when recorded punishment (i.e., α = 0.1
and M = 5) is considered, there exists an evolution resonance of standard deviation.
Bottom panel: it characterizes the evolution of cooperation. With respect to the recorded
punishment, the evolution resonance of standard deviation will lead to an obvious reverse
of cooperation to the dominance. Note that the horizontal axis is logarithmic and that
values of S(G) and ρc are recorded also in-between full Monte Carlo steps (MCS) to ensure
accuracy. Depicted results were obtained for b = 1.05 and K = 0.1. and K = 0.1 on a
400× 400 square lattice.
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Figure 5: (color online)Phase separation lines on the K-b parameter plane for different
situations on the square lattice. Lines denote the border separating mixed C +D (below)
and pure defector D states. Note, irrespective of which kind of situations, there exists an
intermediate uncertainty in the strategy adoption process (an intermediate value of K) for
which the survivability of cooperators is optimal. But when the recorded punishment (i.e.,
α = 0.1 and M = 5) is considered, the existence of optimal uncertainty for cooperation is
most obvious. D ↔ C+D transition is qualitatively different.
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